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“Knowing the problem is 90% of solving it”.
Bill Evans.
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Motivated by some recent news1, a journalist asks a group of physicists: “What’s the meaning of the violation
of Bell’s inequality?” One physicist answers: “It means that non-locality is an established fact”. Another says:
“There is no non-locality; the message is that measurement outcomes are irreducibly random”. A third one
says: “It cannot be answered simply on purely physical grounds, the answer requires an act of metaphysical
judgement”a. Puzzled by the answers, the journalist keeps asking questions about quantum theory: “What
is teleported in quantum teleportation?” “How does a quantum computer really work?” Shockingly, for each
of these questions, the journalist obtains a variety of answers which, in many cases, are mutually exclusive.
At the end of the day, the journalist asks: “How do you plan to make progress if, after 90 years of quantum
theory, you still don’t know what it means? How can you possibly identify the physical principles of quantum
theory or expand quantum theory into gravity if you don’t agree on what quantum theory is about?” Here
we argue that it is becoming urgent to solve this too long lasting problem. For that, we point out that the
interpretations of quantum theory are, essentially, of two types and that these two types are so radically
different that there must be experiments that, when analyzed outside the framework of quantum theory, lead
to different empirically testable predictions. Arguably, even if these experiments do not end the discussion,
they will add new elements to the list of strange properties that some interpretations must have, therefore
they will indirectly support those interpretations that do not need to have all these strange properties.
As Mermin points out, “quantum theory is the most
useful and powerful theory physicists have ever devised.
Yet today, nearly 90 years after its formulation, disagree-
ment about the meaning of the theory is stronger than
ever. New interpretations appear every day. None ever
disappear”5. This situation is odd and is arguably an ob-
stacle for scientific progress, or at least for a certain kind
of scientific progress. The periodic efforts of listing and
comparing the increasing number of interpretations6–9
show that there is something persistent since the formula-
tion of quantum theory: Interpretations are essentially of
two types; those that view quantum probabilities of mea-
surement outcomes as determined by intrinsic properties
of the world and those that do not. Here we call them
“type-I” and “type-II”, respectively. In Table I some in-
terpretations are classified according to this criterion and
some extra details are given.
Two observations can be made in the light of Table I.
Observation one: The extended belief that both types
of interpretations “yield the same empirical conse-
quences” and therefore “the choice between them
cannot be made simply on purely physical grounds
but it requires an act of metaphysical judgement”4
is arguably wrong. The two types are so different
a)All of our characters are fictitious. However, it might be in-
teresting to compare their points of view with those in Refs.2–4,
respectively
that is very unlikely that distinguishing between
them is forever out of reach of scientific method.
In fact, by making some reasonable assumptions
it can be shown39 that type-I interpretations must
have more strange properties than those suggested
by previous approaches40–42.
Observation two: The proposed principles for recon-
structing quantum theory43–50 are neutral with re-
spect to interpretations. This may be a drawback.
Although these approaches can lead to the mathe-
matical structure of the theory, the need to remain
neutral may be an obstacle for identifying physical
principles. This becomes evident when the pro-
posed principles are examined in the light of some
specific interpretations (e.g., QBism33–35). Then,
not all of them are equally important: Some sim-
ply follow from the assumed interpretational frame-
work; only a few of them give some physical insight.
This suggests that there may be a bonus in non-
neutral reconstructions of quantum theory. This
will be developed elsewhere.
This Table and these observations should be taken as
motivations for further work. The fact that they may be
controversial by themselves, and the interest showed by
many colleagues, justify presenting them separately from
any of these works.
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2ψ-Ontic ψ-Epistemic
Type-I
(intrinsic realism)
Bohmian mechanics10,11 Einstein19
Many worlds12,13 Ballentine20
Modal14,15 Consistent histories21,22
Bell’s “beables”16 Spekkens23
Collapse theories∗17,18
About knowledge About belief
Type-II
(participatory realism)
Copenhagen24,25 QBism33–35
Wheeler26,27
Relational28,29
Zeilinger3,30
No “interpretation”31
Brukner32
TABLE I. Some interpretations of quantum theory classified according to whether they view probabilities of
measurement outcomes as determined or not by intrinsic properties of the observed system. Type-I interpretations
are defined as those in which the probabilities of measurement outcomes are determined by intrinsic properties of the observed
system. Type-I interpretations can be “ψ-ontic”36, if they view the quantum state as an intrinsic property of the observed
system, or “ψ-epistemic”36, if they view the quantum state as representing knowledge of an underlying objective reality in
a sense somewhat analogous to that in which a state in classical statistical mechanics assigns a probability distribution to
points in phase space. “Type-II interpretations” are defined as those which do not view the probabilities of measurement
outcomes of quantum theory as determined by intrinsic properties of the observed system. Type-II interpretations do not deny
the existence of an objective world but, according to them, quantum theory does not deal directly with intrinsic properties of
the observed system, but with the experiences an observer or agent has of the observed system. Type-II interpretations can
be “about knowledge” if they view the quantum state as an observer’s knowledge about the results of future experiments, or
“about belief” if they view the quantum state as an agent’s expectations about the results of future actions. This table is based
on a similar table made by Leifer37, but has many significant differences and incorporates suggestions from many colleagues
(see acknowledgements). The term “participatory realism” (inspired by Wheeler’s “participatory universe”27) was suggested
by Fuchs38. ∗: Collapse theories modify or supplement the unitary formalism of quantum theory; therefore, they are not pure
interpretations.
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